Cobas AM: Nueva Gestora de Francisco García Paramés

Es que a caso no cotiza brk o markel por encima de valor en libros?

Y contestando a su pregunta, si, el NAV incluye los impuestos que se tendrian que pagar en caso de vender la posición.

 

No soy un experto societario, pero a uno le puede llamar la atención que unicamente tenga reconocidas esos impuestos por ganancias no realizadas. Esto se debe a la naturaleza de PSH, por eso cotiza en UK y no en usa. 

 Furthermore, unlike most conglomerates, including Berkshire Hathaway, which are structured as tax-paying C corporations, PSH is a Guernsey closed-ended fund which generally does not pay any corporate taxes.b As a result, PSH does not have the same “switching costs” as a tax-paying conglomerate, which must pay corporate taxes if it sells an investment at a price in excess of its tax basis. Unlike the typical conglomerate which: (1) has an extremely limited universe of opportunities to buy controlling interests in great businesses at sensible prices, (2) must pay corporate taxes when it sells an existing holding, and (3) is limited in the amount of its assets it can invest in non-controlling interests, PSH suff ers from none of these constraints. PSH has another important benefi t because of its closed-ended fund structure and the highly liquid nature of our portfolio, which is almost entirely comprised of publicly traded, large capitalization, investment-grade U.S. equities. We have been able to access low-cost, long-term, non-margin debt in the form of publicly traded bonds to fi nance our investments and reduce our cost of capital, which should enhance our ability to generate high, long-term rates of return. While in recent years, we have been able to issue bonds at attractive long-term rates, we still believe that PSH remains an underappreciated and underrated credit. Our credit remains misunderstood likely because we are a one-of-a-kind company, and it will therefore take time for fi xed income investors and analysts to fully appreciate our story. 

 Annual Letter 2014. One further fact about our rail operation is important for you to know: Unlike many other lessors, we manufacture our own tank cars, about 6,000 of them in a good year. We do not book any profit when we transfer cars from our manufacturing division to our leasing division. Our fleet is consequently placed on our books at a “bargain” price. The difference between that figure and a “retail” price is only slowly reflected in our earnings through smaller annual depreciation charges that we enjoy over the 30-year life of the car. Because of that fact as well as others, Marmon’s rail fleet is worth considerably more than the $5 billion figure at which it is carried on our books.
Annual Letter 2012. Tank cars are owned by either shippers or lessors, not by railroads. At yearend Union Tank Car and Procor together owned 97,000 cars having a net book value of $4 billion. A new car, it should be noted, costs upwards of $100,000 

 
Annual Letter 2016. During the first half of those years, Berkshire’s net worth was roughly equal to the number that really counts: the intrinsic value of the business. The similarity of the two figures existed then because most of our resources were deployed in marketable securities that were regularly revalued to their quoted prices (less the tax that would be incurred if they were to be sold: Semper Augustus Investments Group LLC - 2019 Letter To Clients. For balance sheet purposes, all gains and losses are muted by a 21% tax rate, with the net unrealized gain carried as a deferred tax liability.). In Wall Street parlance, our balance sheet was then in very large part “marked to market.” 
By the early 1990s, however, our focus was changing to the outright ownership of businesses, a shift that materially diminished the relevance of balance sheet figures. That disconnect occurred because the accounting rules (commonly referred to as “GAAP”) that apply to companies we control differ in important ways from those used to value marketable securities. Specifically, the accounting for businesses we own requires that the carrying value of “losers” be written down when their failures become apparent. “Winners,” conversely, are never revalued upwards. 

We’ve experienced both outcomes: As is the case in marriage, business acquisitions often deliver surprises after the “I do’s.” I’ve made some dumb purchases, paying far too much for the economic goodwill of companies we acquired. That later led to goodwill write-offs and to consequent reductions in Berkshire’s book value. We’ve also had some winners among the businesses we’ve purchased – a few of the winners very big – but have not written those up by a penny. 

We have no quarrel with the asymmetrical accounting that applies here. But, over time, it necessarily widens the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value. Today, the large – and growing – unrecorded gains at our winners produce an intrinsic value for Berkshire’s shares that far exceeds their book value. The overage is truly huge in our property/casualty insurance business and significant also in many other operations.