Cobas AM: Nueva Gestora de Francisco García Paramés

 off-topic: sobre Portfolio management. Estaba recordando la charla de verano de Javier Barrio, el Head de Trading de azValor, en el q decía q los gestores estaban obsesionados con unos porcentajes en la cartera, por ejemplo, si los gestores querían un 20% de la cartera en oro, y el oro subía mucho, pues vendían oro y lo metían en oil, q había caído. Creo q es un error, porque si enganchas una tendencia fuerte como #uranium, pues vas vendiendo todo el rato, y no puedes aplicar lo de "let your winners run, and cut your losses". 

 Berkshire’s stock portfolio was ridiculously expensive in 1998, matched by the stock market and likewise by Berkshire’s own shares. Berkshire paid $22 billion in stock for General Reinsurance, of which $14.5 billion was goodwill. That’s a pretty healthy premium for the tangible equity of an insurance company. Must be a catch. Berkshire issued General Re shareholders 272,200 shares of equivalent A shares at $80,882 per share, 2.9 times Berkshire’s March 31, 1998 book value. The catch, part of it: Berkshire’s intrinsic worth was only about half that price, meaning Berkshire bought General Re for a little more than $11 billion, not the $22 billion headline price. Berkshire’s use of its overvalued stock as currency