Washington Mutual demanda a la FDIC por 17 billones US$ + daños

El enemigo de mi enemigo es mi amigo... esto no se ha acabado para JPM y FDIC más bien acaba de empezar.

Pero eso significa que se rompe el POR?

Todavía no. Eso es en la Corte Apelación lo nuestro aun está pendiente

Pero eso significa que los bonistas WMB siguen persiguiendo a FDIC y JPM aunque sea en cortes diferentes asi que de dar los releases exigidos por el POR nada de nada...

Por eso, que la actuación contradice las intenciones de los bonistas ...

A los Bonistas WMB le ofrecieron (creo recordar) un hueso de 335 Millones. Me da que no estan contentos y van a por los Billones... la próxima en saltar podría ser la FDIC y dejar a JPM solito ante el peligro.

Esto no cuadra con que los bonistas WMB ya estaban en el saco del POR y por lo tanto la FDIC aceptaba firmar el POR. Hay que recordar que FDIC no aceptaba el POR sin el convenio con los bonistas.

Si los tenedores de bonos WMB no estan de acuerdo ¿Porque la FDIC sigue de acuerdo con el último POR ?

Algo huele a podrido en las reuniones de esta pandilla de chorizos o la información no se interpreta correctamente.

Ademas no he entendido anteriormente que aceptaran 335 millones cuando reclaman 10 bill. creo recordar, esto solo es aceptable si tienes la CERTEZA de que o aceptas la oferta o no hay nada que reclamar.

Esa es la cuestión... Si Wmb no traga
cuanto tardara la Fdic en abandonar el barco?

LOS HECHOS

In 2004, JPMC & Co. recognized a weakness in its market share in fast-growing areas of the South and West coast regions of the United States.12
WMI and WMB, collectively (“Washington Mutual”), possessed a strong branch banking presence in those areas.13
In 2004, JPMC & Co. set a goal to acquire Washington Mutual’s banking franchise and geographic market.14
In the months and years that followed, JPMC & Co. developed and executed a scheme designed to achieve this end.15

By the spring of 2008, circumstances were ripe for JPMC & Co. to obtain the valuable assets of WMB through a purchase transaction.16
Washington Mutual faced financial stress due to market forces.17
JPMC & Co. had previously obtained information from Washington Mutual under a promise of confidentiality as a result of recent due diligence.18
Therefore, in the spring of 2008, JPMC & Co. set in motion a plan to obtain the valuable assets of WMB by way of a FDIC-Receiver, free of obligations to bondholders, including Appellants, and other stakeholders.19

During the spring and summer of 2008, JPMC & Co. executed a plan that included, among other things, such unlawful means as:
• accessing Washington Mutual’s confidential financial information from “due diligence” under false pretenses, and by other breaches of trust and fair dealing;20
• negotiating with Washington Mutual in bad faith while at the same time negotiating with the FDIC (using improperly-obtained information);21
• disclosing JPMC & Co.’s negotiations with the FDIC-Receiver to outside parties, and preventing and/or deterring potential suitors from negotiating with Washington Mutual;22
• using Washington Mutual’s confidential information to present misleading estimates of Washington Mutual’s financial health to rating agencies and negatively affecting WMB’s credit ratings;23
• disclosing confidential and misleading information to news media;24
• leaking confidential information and misinformation to the public and inciting depositors to withdraw funds from WMB;25
• disclosing confidential information to JPMC & Co. investors;26
• pressuring government regulators to seize WMB and sell its assets to JPMC, despite the fact that JPMC had agreed to not use Washington Mutual’s confidential information beyond the permitted uses in the confidentiality agreement;27
• using confidential information in breach of its promise and trust in order to craft a bid to the FDIC-Receiver that would ensure obtaining the assets at a below-market value “fire-sale” price.28

By late September of 2008, JPMC & Co. had succeeded in influencing the financial and business circumstances faced by Washington Mutual to the point where government regulators saw no reasonable option but to seize WMB and sell its assets to the only “available” purchaser—JPMC.29
Therefore, on September 25, 2008, WMB was seized by the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) and placed into an FDIC receivership.30
JPMC & Co. used its wholly owned subsidiary, JPMC Bank, to purchase WMB assets from the FDIC-Receiver.31

The assets obtained by JPMC were freed of obligations to bondholders, and the price paid by JPMC Bank for the WMB assets was far below the fair value of the assets.32

Shortly after the deal, JPMC & Co. admitted, in fourth quarter financial reports, that the fair value of the assets it obtained from WMB was $1.3 billion more than the $1.9 billion it had paid, and booked an extraordinary gain in that amount. This gain was in addition to a $581 million extraordinary gain reported in October 15, 2008 as being the result of WMB’s acquisition.33

http://www.ghostofwamu.com/documents/10-05245/10-05245-0018.pdf

Extraido de la pagina 18.